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FlexRay network is a deterministic and fault-tolerant high speed vehicular
bus which provides the reliability, safety and real-time capability to fulfill
stringent requirements of safety critical vehicular applications such as anti-
lock brake system and power train. Current FlexRay protocol is only a
pure communication network without security mechanism. It may cause
to leak sensitive information of critical components. To prevent this, we
focused on enhancing security for FlexRay protocol in this thesis.
First, we enhanced the confidentiality and authenticity for FlexRay us-
ing AES-CCM (32-bit MAC). The design assures that FlexRay message
is transmitted in ciphertext and consumed with authenticity verification.
We evaluated the design through a two-node FlexRay network. The result
shows that possible attacks cannot compromise this enhanced design.
Second, we optimized the authenticity for FlexRay message using AEGIS
(64-bit MAC). This design adapts AEGIS for dynamic segment with a 64-
bit MAC which provides higher level of authentication assurance compared
to the previous design with AES-CCM (32-bit MAC). The benefits of this
design are: shorter latency, higher security and real-time computation. We
implemented AEGIS within a two-node FlexRay network and verified the
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This introduction chapter presents the motivation, contribution, and out-
line of this work.
1.1 Motivation
Since 1980s, electronic components has began to replace pure mechanical
or electromechanical components in vehicles. These in-vehicle electronic
components are named as electronic control units (ECUs). They commu-
nicate between themselves and respective hardware sensors in vehicle to
provide a huge number of sophisticated and novel functionalities. To en-
able such advanced features, software-driven automotive applications and
services are applied to reduce cost comparing to a sole hardware based
approach. Figure 1-1 shows the evolution of automotive applications from
mechanical-based method to almost software-driven one [1].
As the huge demand for software-driven automotive applications and
services expands quickly, the software development plays a critical impor-
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Figure 1-1: Development of automotive applications together with increas-
ing demand of automotive IT system security
tant role in automotive industry. The cost of electronic components are
estimated to reach 50% in 2015 [2]. The cost of software development
for the electronic components consumes up to 70% of the total develop-
ment cost [3]. Moreover, the fast evolution of information technology (IT)
becomes the driving force behind automotive evolution in software and
hardware, which contributes more than 90% of all vehicle innovations [4].
Applications realized as embedded IT systems ranges from single ECU to
the complex entertainment system. A high-end vehicle contains up to 80
processors which are connected within various communication buses and
up to several hundred megabytes of embedded software code [3].
Software development in automotive industry has already adopted many
classic IT software development approaches such as software engineering,
software quality control, and software safety measures. However, in the
development of automotive software, little attention has been paid to one
aspect of modern IT systems: Security. Compared to automotive safety
which refers to protection against technical failures such as fault tolerance,
automotive security should provide protection against unauthorized access
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and manipulation to vehicle embedded systems [5]. Although automotive
safety and security stands for two completely different concepts, they are
highly related. Enhancing automotive security could help to improve au-
tomotive safety and vice versa. In fact, various malicious attacks on auto-
motive applications have already been reported. Conventional attacks such
as digital tachograph system manipulation or unauthorized components re-
placement are very common. Illegal manipulation on electronic components
also results in leakage of personal information or legal purchased content.
As the complexity of automotive applications increases dramatically,
the underlying automotive communication networks become more impor-
tant. Automotive communication networks are used to realize data commu-
nication for vehicles, including in-vehicle, vehicle-to-device communication,
vehicle-to-infrastructure, and vehicle-to-vehicle communication. As more
V2X applications (e.g. vehicle-to-infrastructure, vehicle-to-vehicle) are de-
ployed in vehicle, more network interfaces are exposed to external parties
that may loosen the restriction on accessing vehicle internal components
[6]. It makes the communication networks facing the security challenge
from external world. Compromising any of the networks may cause poten-
tial risks to driver’s privacy and safety like personal information leakage,
or malicious manipulating the automotive operations.
However, most current existing automotive communication networks
do not have security capabilities against malicious attacks. Several factors
make it difficult to develop security mechanism on vehicles. First, conven-
tional vehicle is almost isolated system with small portion of non-critical
3
components open to external world, which is hard to access and manipu-
late for third parties. Thus, vehicle makers have few incentives to integrate
security [7]. Second, the first priority for vehicle embedded system is al-
ways to achieve core functionalities but not security mechanisms. Besides,
automotive development uses bottom-up approach to develop from simple
hardware-based microcontollers to complicated software-driven distributed
systems [3]. The top-down approach with systematic software and security-
engineering development principles are rarely used in automotive industry.
Consequently, the development of security mechanism is more likely to fail.
Moreover, building an eco-system for automotive security is complicated
and costly. Vehicle-makers need to pay extra money to adapt their devel-
opment process without apparent benefits.
With potential security challenges of automotive communication net-
works, the fact of lacking security mechanisms provides the motivation for
this work. We narrow down the scope of this work to the security of in-
vehicle communication network, especially the FlexRay network.
1.2 Thesis Contribution
This thesis presents a comprehensive and detailed insight into the threats
and protection of in-vehicle networks, especially the FlexRay network.
Based on the analysis and evaluation of the security properties of FlexRay
network, we proposed a novel approach to provide assurance of confiden-
tiality and authenticity for FlexRay network. In detail, the thesis works on
the following topics.
4
Evaluation and analysis of FlexRay network security proper-
ties. The thesis starts with presenting in-vehicle communication networks
including CAN Bus and FlexRay. The FlexRay specifications version 2.1
[8] is described in details. Then security properties of FlexRay are evalu-
ated and analyzed, which brings the fact that FlexRay network is exposed
to external risks and is facing security challenges.
Review of the classic cryptographic mechanisms. The thesis also
gives a state-of-the-art introduction of classic cryptographic mechanisms
which provide the assurance of security and possible solution for automotive
security. Based on the algorithm properties, we discussed the possibilities
of applying the algorithms to FlexRay network.
Adaptation of cryptographic mechanism with FlexRay net-
work. Based on the background studies, we proposed a novel approach
to adapt cryptographic algorithms with FlexRay network. We have de-
signed a security layer on FlexRay in which cryptographic mechanism is
applied on FlexRay messages. In this way, FlexRay network is ensured
with confidentiality and authenticity.
1.3 Thesis Organization
In Chapter 2, the thesis starts by introducing the automotive communica-
tion networks and highlighting the technical properties and capabilities of
FlexRay network. The desired security properties for automotive network
are explained, together with a detailed evaluation of FlexRay security prop-
erties. Based on the evaluations, possible attacks on FlexRay is described
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in detail. In addition, related work which have been done on security of
in-vehicle communication networks is presented. In Chapter 3, based on
the literature review, we proposed a solution to integrate a cipher modes,
AES-CCM, with FlexRay network to enhance the security. In Chapter
4, we proposed another approach to optimize the authenticity of FlexRay
messages by adapting AGEIS with dynamic segment of FlexRay network.





2.1 In-vehicle Communication Networks
Automotive communication means the communication applied on vehicles.
In-vehicle communication is the communication that connects all ECUs
and hardware sensors inside vehicle. It plays a critical role for vehicle’s
fundamental driving behavior. Vehicle interacts with external wired de-
vices through certain restricted ports. It is vehicle-to-device communica-
tion (V2D) which is mainly used for fault diagnosis and repair, embedded
software updates, or entertainment services which integrate with smart
mobile devices. Moreover, vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I) enables vehicle
to share information with surrounding public infrastructures through wire-
less communication channel. The dedicated short range communication
(DSRC) used in the electronic road pricing (ERP) system in Singapore is a
typical V2I application [9]. In next few years, nearby vehicles may directly
exchange data with each other to share instant driving information, which
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is the so called vehicle-to-vehicle communication (V2V). In this thesis, we
mainly focus on in-vehicle communication network.
One typical example of in-vehicle network is the one deployed on BMW
E65 (7 series). It consists of five different bus systems (PT-CAN, byteflight,
K-CAN periphery, MOST, and K-CAN system) in which distribute more
than 60 ECUs [10]. Compared to point-to-point connection, in-vehicle
networks logically connect ECUs using the same set of wires. So that
ECUs in different sub-networks are able to share data of any single sensor
installed anywhere inside vehicle. To standardize in-vehicle networks for
easily extension and implementation, various in-vehicle network protocols
has been made. Those protocols provide certain schemes to schedule data
communication and manage network resources.
A number of in-vehicle networks are designed for different purposes.
They support large range of applications from basic electronic engine con-
trol, driving assistant system to the user-accessible infotainment applica-
tions. In-vehicle networks could group into five types based on technical
property difference.
Sub-bus network. Sub-bus, for instance, Local Interconnect Net-
work (LIN), is a serial network protocol used to form small and cheap
sub-networks consisting of simple components in master-slave mode. Data
transmission rate of LIN is up to 20kb/s in the LIN specification 2.0 [11].
Event-triggered network. Event-triggered networks like Controller
Area Network (CAN) are the most common used ones. They are used for
real-time in-vehicle communication between ECUs and support complex
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systems like Engine Management System (EMS) and Brake Management
System (BMS). CAN can range from low-speed (20kb/s) to high-speed
(1Mb/s) [12].
Time-triggered network. Time-triggered networks such as FlexRay,
TTP guarantee hard real-time capability and deterministic transmission so
that most safety critical systems are applied these networks. FlexRay can
support high data rate up to 10Mb/s [8].
Multimedia network. Multimedia networks like MOST which emerged
in last few decades are designed with high performance, large bandwidth
capabilities to fulfill the requirements of entertainment systems. MOST
can support even higher rate up to 25Mb/s [13].
Wireless network. Wireless networks enable vehicle to exchange in-
formation with external world such as nearby infrastructure and vehicles.
2.2 Introduction of CAN Bus and FlexRay
This section gives a general overview of CAN bus and FlexRay, which are
two typical in-vehicle networks.
2.2.1 CAN Bus
CAN protocol is designed in ISO 11898 for serial data communication at
bit rates ranging from 20 kbps to 1Mbps [12]. CAN protocol provides the
advantage that ECUs could connect through a common bus which reduces
the complexity of wiring. The protocol includes physical layer and datalink
layer, definition of message structures, arbitration scheme for media access
control, and mechanisms for fault detection and confinement [14].
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Bus Arbitration Scheme. CAN bus arbitrates each node to the bus
by a non-destructive bitwise arbitration technique. Each node compares
the level of bit transferred with the level which is monitored on the bus.
Bit will continue to transfer if these levels are the same. CAN bus is
a distributed control system in which no central controller is needed to
control the data flow on the bus. Thus, messages are broadcasted on the
common bus with no addressing structure for messages. Each node decides
whether to receive the data or not.
Messages Prioritization. Messages have a defined priority to resolve
conflict condition when more than one nodes send messages to the bus at
the same time. The message with higher priority gains access to the bus
firstly. Each node is able to receive messages on the bus and synchronize
its clock with the receiving message quickly.
Error Detection and Handling. The CAN protocol provides error
detection and handling mechanism in case messages are not properly re-
ceived. Corrupted messages are automatically retransmitted whenever the
bus is free. The recovery time is at most 29 bit times from detecting an
error. Failed nodes can also be detected and isolated from the bus.
Latency and Consistency Guarantee for Communication. The
protocol provides guarantee of latency times and consistency of data system
wide. System flexibility of the protocol makes it possible to add or remove
a node from the bus without any change of other nodes and the bus.
CAN protocol needs to work with other higher level protocols to imple-
ment a complete system including communication management for connec-
10
tion establishment and start-up procedures, node addresses management,
CAN data frame formatting, and system-wide error handling. Nevertheless,
the protocol provides safety mechanism against technical failures.
Data Error Detection. CAN bus provides error detection and han-
dling which can result the probability of unhandled errors less than 4.7 ×
10−11 [14]. The methods used to detect errors includes checking the trans-
mitted level with the level of the bus on each node, cyclic redundancy
checking for each transmitted data, Bit stuffing, and frame checking for
each message. Hence, the detectable errors include bus wide errors, node
errors, message errors with up to five randomly distributed errors, and
burst errors.
Node Fault Confinement. Every node in the CAN bus has three
states to handle fault. In error active state, the nodes are connected in
bus communication and send an active error signal whenever an error has
been detected. In error passive state, the nodes are connected in bus com-
munication and send an passive error signal whenever an error has been
detected. In bus off state, the nodes will disconnect from the bus. Each
node is set to error active state initially. An error active node sends active
error signal whenever detecting errors. It sets to error passive state when
either the transmit error count or the receive error count equals or exceeds
128. An error passive node sends passive error signal whenever detecting
errors. It sets to bus off state when the transmit error count equals or
exceeds 256. A bus off node will be disconnected from the bus.
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2.2.2 FlexRay
Safety-critical applications which communicate with the chassis require
high standard on the reliability, safety and real-time capability of the un-
derlying communication network. The network needs to guarantee de-
terministic and fault tolerant of data communication independent of bus
load. Although CAN protocol has been used widely in the automotive in-
dustry, it cannot fulfill the requirement since it is based on an event-driven
communication approach in which every node must be able to access the
common bus at any time. In addition, the mechanism used to resolve
collisions makes it impossible to determine the communication sequence
until runtime. Adding or removing bus nodes also affects the communi-
cation sequence. Moreover, CAN protocol cannot fulfill the requirement
of fault tolerance due to the lack of redundant structures and techniques.
Besides, its speed limits to 500kbps in series production. Therefore, in
1999, BWM and DaimlerChrysler worked together to design and develop a
novel, time-triggered and fault tolerant communication standard, namely
FlexRay protocol. The FlexRay consortium published version 2.1 of the
specification in 2005 [8]. The specification is available in ISO 17458.
2.2.2.1 Communication Architecture
A FlexRay network consists of FlexRay nodes and a physical transmission
FlexRay bus interconnecting all FlexRay nodes as shown in Figure 2-1.
FlexRay protocol does not rely on its underlying physical topology so that
FlexRay network may includes multiple physical topologies like point-to-
12
Figure 2-1: FlexRay network consisting FlexRay nodes and FlexRay bus
Figure 2-2: FlexRay network could build up based on various topologies
such as point-to-point, line, or star nodes
point, line topology, passive star topology or active star topology as in
Figure 2-2.
FlexRay protocol uses a redundant layout of the communication chan-
nel. Each channel can perform data transmission up to 10 Mbps. The re-
dundant channel can be used for either fault tolerance or increasing trans-
mission rate up to 20 Mbps. Each FlexRay message can be configured
accordingly. FlexRay protocol is based on a time-triggered communication
architecture in which static scheduling communication is the core mecha-
nism. The static communication provides the assurance of deterministic
13
Figure 2-3: TDMA scheme used for the static segment in FlexRay network
with multiple bus nodes
data communication and fault tolerance techniques which can be attained
by integrating redundancies and synchronous action triggering.
Compared to undetermined communication sequences in the CAN pro-
tocol, FlexRay protocol uses Time Division Multiple Access (TDMA) mech-
anism which makes FlexRay node to access the bus in a controlled manner.
Each FlexRay node is configured with a communication schedule, which de-
fines a specific time slot to each FlexRay message in one communication
cycle. Figure 2-3 demonstrates a communication schedule and communica-
tion sequences in FlexRay network. The FlexRay network consists of four
nodes. Each node needs to transmit two messages at specific time slots in
the communication cycle.
2.2.2.2 FlexRay Node
A FlexRay node is an electronic control unit (ECU) as shown in Figure
2-4. It connects to FlexRay bus through FlexRay interface which consists
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Figure 2-4: Single FlexRay node consists of host application, FlexRay con-
troller, and FlexRay transceivers
of a FlexRay controller and one or two FlexRay transceivers depending on
the number of channels.
FlexRay controller implements the communication protocol including
framing, bus access, error detection and handling, synchronization, node
sleep/wake up, and coding/decoding messages. It can be either an inte-
grated FlexRay controller or a stand-alone FlexRay controller. An inte-
grated FlexRay controller is designed as part of the host and simple to use.
An stand-alone FlexRay controller provides the flexibility to separate from
the host ECU. The FlexRay transceiver transforms signal between FlexRay
controller and the physical transmission bus. It transforms logical signal
stream from FlexRay controller to physical signal stream for the bus.
2.2.2.3 Bus Access
FlexRay protocol realizes the bus access using both Time Division Multiple
Access (TDMA) and Flexible Time Division Multiple Access (FTDMA).
A communication cycle consists of static segment with deterministic data
15
Figure 2-5: FlexRay communication cycle includes static segment and dy-
namic segment
communication and dynamic segment with non-deterministic communica-
tion.
TDMA for static segment. Each node on the bus is scheduled with
static time slots of equal time length to transmit data. During the com-
munication, each FlexRay node is guaranteed to access the bus exclusively
according to the schedule. Figure 2-5 shows how the communication sched-
ule is done for static segment.
FTDMA for dynamic segment. FlexRay protocol also provides
mechanism for event-triggered communication in the dynamic segment as
shown in Figure 2-5. FlexRay node can transmit dynamic messages as
needed in dynamic segment. But dynamic segment has a finite length, not
all FlexRay nodes are able to transmit dynamic messages in the current
communication cycle.
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2.3 Analysis of Security Risks for In-vehicle
Networks
2.3.1 Exposures of In-vehicle Networks
As more vehicle-to-x communication applications are deployed on vehicle,
in-vehicle networks are exposing more interfaces for external parties. The
exposures of in-vehicle networks enable potential attacks on internal elec-
tronic components. Manipulating mileage counter, replacing unauthorized
components or spoofing tachometer becomes very common [15]. Moreover,
increasing integration of vehicle-to-x applications like electronic tolling sys-
tem, digital tachograph and online paid content services provides the in-
centive for attacking vehicle systems.
Several groups of people including car owner, garage personnel, and
third parties have possible interests to attack in-vehicle networks. Table 2.1
presents three possible groups of attackers and indicates their capabilities
and accessibilities [16].
Table 2.1: Automotive networks attackers with various capabilities and
accessibilities
Attacker Capabilities Accessibility
1.Vehicle owner Varied Full
2.Garage personnel Varied Full
3.Third party Varied Feasible
Vehicle owner. Vehicle owner has full physical access to in-vehicle
buses. Generally, they have limited knowledge and technical equipments.
The capability to attack in-vehicle networks should be low.
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Garage Personnel. Garage Personnel also has full physical access
to in-vehicle buses. Since they may have both adequate knowledge and
equipments, it is possible for them to manipulate electrical components
and underlying communication networks in vehicle. Garage personnel’s
capability to attack should be relative high.
Third Party. Third party includes competitors, unauthorized person
and organizations. They may attack in-vehicle networks to steal driver’s
personal data or reverse-engineer specific devices for confidential technical
information. Varying capabilities of third party should be expected.
2.3.2 Security Challenges
Due to the nature of automotive industry, current existing in-vehicle com-
munication networks are easy to access and manipulate. First, all data
communication between ECUs on in-vehicle bus is unencrypted in plain-
text. ECUs are not able to authenticate a receiving message. Most of the
in-vehicle communication protocol specifications including system structure
and communication mechanism are freely available to the public. Moreover,
more serious hazard comes from the interconnection of different types of
sub-networks. Each ECU is theoretically able to send message to any other
ECU in any connected sub-network through the central gateway devices.
Thus, one compromised sub-network may endanger the whole in-vehicle
networks. Also increasing integration with external wireless networks pro-
vides interfaces for external parties to penetrate safety-critical vehicle sys-
tems.
Although in-vehicle networks provide assurance of safety protection and
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Figure 2-6: Overview of various in-vehicle networks ranging from LIN sub-
network to MOST subnetwork
fault tolerance [17][18][19] as shown in Figure 2-6, they do not have the
ability to prevent against malicious attacks. The increasing coupling of
different type of communication networks with user accessible multimedia
buses and even external wireless network makes in-vehicle networks facing
even high security risks. Moreover, in-vehicle communication systems be-
come more complicated and harder to analyze. The following parts present
possible attacks on in-vehicle networks, assuming that attackers may ei-
ther have physical access or logical access to the networks. Physical access
means direct connection with bus physical wires. Logical access means ac-
cess the network indirectly though other interfaces like diagnosis port or
wireless connection [20].
LIN. Interconnected CAN network could send malicious sleep frames
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to deactivate LIN sub-network until another wake-up frame is sent. LIN
synchronization mechanism could also be attacked by sending a frame with
malicious SYNCH filed information, which causes LIN sub-network to se-
riously malfunction. LIN could not be prevented from unauthorized mes-
sages.
CAN. CAN network uses the priority based CSMA/CD access con-
trol approach which enables jam attacks on the communication channel.
Constantly sending malicious messages with top priority into the channel
would block transmission of all other messages even though the receiving
controllers will discard the malicious messages. Moreover, CAN network’s
fault protection mechanism would disconnect all controllers if any fault is
located. Attacks could send specific error flags into the channel to fake the
fault. CAN could not be prevented from unauthorized messages.
FlexRay. Much like CAN protocol fault detection, bus guardian in
FlexRay controller would deactivate the controller if receiving any faked er-
ror messages. Attacks could also fail the network if SYNC messages sent to
the channel in one static cycle are more than certain number. Furthermore,
malicious sleep frames would deactivate the controllers with power-saving
capability. FlexRay could not be prevented from unauthorized messages.
MOST. MOST uses master-slave approach to synchronize timing. Ma-
licious timing frames from the central master node to slaves would cause
malfunctions of the MOST synchronize mechanism. Traffic jamming attack
could also happen on MOST network by keeping sending malicious chan-
nel requests, which would waste bandwidth. Similar to CAN’s CSMA/CD
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Table 2.2: Exposures and harms of attacks on different in-vehicle networks
Group Subnetwork Event-triggered Time-triggered Multimedia Wireless
Bus LIN CAN FlexRay MOST Bluetooth
Exposure Low High Acute Low Varied
Harms Lose funtionality Lose driving safety Accident Data theft Unauthorized access
access control mechanism, MOST is vulnerable to jamming attacks as well.
MOST could not be prevented from unauthorized messages.
Bluetooth. Due to the nature of wireless communication that all data
exchange is broadcast over an open air medium, the data is easy to capture
and analyze. There are already malicious softwares attacking Bluetooth
devices.
There are several reasons to make it difficult to implement security.
First, the most important protection for drivers is safety but not security.
Hardware resources constraint the implementation of additional security
mechanism. The complexity of involved parties is a big challenge. Insuf-
ficient cryptographic knowledge of automotive industry will increase the
cost to develop. Additional hardware and software support will require
processing updates and incur costs as well. Hence, with the increasing se-
curity risks, the challenge is to provide security solutions in a cost-effective
approach.
Successful malicious attacks on in-vehicle networks may cause various
degree of consequences from minor comfort restriction up to serious damage
to driver’s life. As shown in Table 2.2 [6], attacking on LIN or multimedia
networks may cause the loss of power of windows or stealing of personal
data. Manipulation on CAN networks may lead to malfunction of driving
assistant functions which may cause threats to driver’s safety. Successful
21
attacking on safety-critical applications on FlexRay network like suddenly
disable braking system may cause serious hazards for the driver and the
nearby road people. Even, simple malicious locking car doors can cause
serious consequence to the driver.
2.4 Related Work
Previous work on in-vehicle networks has been mainly focused on safety
issues against technical failures such as in [17] [19] [21] [22] [23]. There-
fore, only a little of work has been done on security aspects of in-vehicle
networks.
Security Risk Evaluation. As integration of electronic devices into
vehicle has increased rapidly, automotive security began to get attention
including embedded system security evaluation in [24] [25], automotive
software protection [3], and potential attacking on existing automotive
security-critical applications [26]. Also automotive communication network
security has been studied in [27] [28] [29] [30]. Wolf et al. [31] has eveluated
security risks and possible attacks on in-vehicle networks like LIN, CAN,
FlexRay, MOST and Bluetooth. This work discussed the exposures of in-
vehicle networks and possible malicious attackers, and highlighted the lack
of confidentiality and authenticity issues.
Attacking Simulation. Nilsson et al. [32] described simulated at-
tacks on CAN bus and introduced the notion of automotive virus. Hoppe
et al. [33] simulated sniffing and replay attacks on the CAN bus in simula-
tion tool. Attacking simulation like denial-of-service on the CAN bus has
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been done in [32] [33] [34] in which the attacking consequences were also
analyzed. High level attacking was also presented in [35] by manipulating
and inserting faked messages into communication networks. Nilsson et al.
[36] presented a first simulation of attacks on FlexRay network. The work
simulated read and spoof attacks on CANoe software and evaluated the
consequences.
Security Protection. Adelsbach [37] proposed automotive security
of requirement models and software updates. Seshadri [38] presented ap-
proaches for assurance of software runtime correctness. Weimerskirch [39]
also proposed solution for component protection. Legal content service
protection has been discussed in [40] [41] [42]. In early 2004, vehicular
communication security has been discussed in [43]. However, the major-
ity of work focused on CAN protocol. In [44], a proposed solution with
additional authentication information was studied for the CAN+ protocol
which requires modification on physical layer of the standard CAN proto-
col. The solution may not be feasible for other communication protocols.
Industry projects has been done for automotive security on a system level
including hardware and software. EVITA project [45] starting on 2008
and ending on 2011 has focused on design, verify, and prototype an archi-
tecture for automotive in-vehicle networks, which protects the electronic
components against tampering and communication data against compro-
mise. The PRESERVE project [46] starting from 2011 and ending on 2014
has further extended the work to security and privacy of vehicle-to-x net-







Safety-critical applications built on FlexRay network require both secu-
rity on data communication and trust on FlexRay node. Messages over
FlexRay network should be kept secret and transmitted between desired
nodes. Classic cryptographic algorithms provide an option to enhance the
confidentiality and authenticity of FlexRay network. Hence, we proposed
to adapt classic cryptographic algorithms with FlexRay network in such a
way that communication messages is encrypted and ECUs on the bus are
authenticated. Before presenting the design in detail, we firstly analyzed
the media access control mechanism of FlexRay protocol.
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Figure 3-1: Timing hierarchy of FlexRay communication cycle, which in-
cludes static segment, dynamic segment, symbol window, and network idle
time.
3.1 Introduction of FlexRay Media Access
Control
3.1.1 Communication Cycle
Communication cycle is the basic element of the media access scheme for
FlexRay protocol. It is repeated and configured based on a communication
schedule. Figure 3-1 [8] shows the timing hierarchy of one communication
cycle. It consists of static segment, dynamic segment, symbol window,
and network idle time in a left-to-right order. It consists of at least static
segment and network idle time segment. Static segment uses time division
multiple access (TDMA) scheme. It could be extending with dynamic
segment and symbol window. The dynamic segment uses flexible time
division multiple access (FTDMA).
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Figure 3-2: Structure of static segment in which a single node is scheduled
to transmit frames in static slot 1 on both channel A and channel B and
static slot 2 on channel A.
3.1.2 Static Segment
Static segment plays a prominent role within communication cycle since it
provides the assurance of deterministic data transmission. It is guaranteed
by the TDMA scheme.
Static segment consists of a number of static slots with equal time
length. Static slots are assigned to FlexRay nodes for transmission of static
data frames. Each FlexRay node maintains synchronized slot counters for
channel A and channel B, which are incremented at the beginning of a
static slot. Figure 3-2 [8] shows a communication schedule for a single
node with in static segments. In static slot 1, the node transmits a frame
on channel A and channel B. In static slot 2, the node only transmits a
frame is transfered on channel A. No frame is allocated in static slot 3.
Static segment may be defined with a maximum of 1023 static slots,
and with a minimum of 2 static slots because at least two FlexRay nodes
are required to generate the global time base. Static slots need to be long
enough to guarantee deterministic data transmission in static segment. The
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Figure 3-3: Structure of the dynamic segment
length of static slots is determined by the length of the longest FlexRay data
frame. The maximum possible signal delay between FlexRay nodes also
affects the length of the static slots. The maximum signal delay permitted
is 2.5 ms.
3.1.3 Dynamic Segment
Dynamic segment is not necessary to be used in communication cycle. It
provides the capability to transmit event-triggered messages. The length of
dynamic segment is always the same during different communication cycles,
which avoids affecting transmission in static segment. Dynamic segment
is always after static segment. Figure 3-3 [8] presents a basic structure of
dynamic segment.
Dynamic segment is based on the FTDMA scheme to schedule commu-
nication. The dynamic messages transmit only if an event occurs to trigger
a message transmission. Figure 3-4 shows a communication schedule of the
dynamic segment for multiple nodes.
FlexRay nodes maintain two local counters for channel A and channel
B. The counter value presents to a specific dynamic message transmitting
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Figure 3-4: Communication schedule of Dynamic segment
by FlexRay node. If there is no request by FlexRay node to transmit
message matching the slot counter value, the counters is incremented. The
dynamic slot is one minislot. If there is a request, message matching the
slot counter value is transmitted. The immediate following dynamic slot is
one minislot.
The steps are repeated until dynamic segment is no longer long enough
to transmit a dynamic message. The dynamic messages which have not
been transmitted are processed in the next communication cycle.
3.1.4 Data Frame
The basic element transmitted in both static segment and dynamic seg-
ment is FlexRay data frame. Figure 3-5 [8] shows the structure of a data
frame, which consists of header segment, payload segment, and trailer seg-
ment. Header segment, payload segment, and trailer segment should be
transmitted in left to right order.
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Figure 3-5: A single FlexRay frame includes header segment, payload seg-
ment, and trailer segment
Header segment. Header segment is a 5-byte string including frame
ID, payload length, header CRC, cycle count, and other 5 bits. It is unique
in each communication cycle because of the combination of frame ID and
cycle count.
Payload segment. Payload segment can contain 0 to 254 bytes of
data. The starting byte is at 0 after header segment. And the number of
byte is increasing by one for each following byte. So the bytes sequence
is from data 0 until data n. The bytes in payload segment maybe fully or
partially used for transmission depending on application configurations.
Trailer segment. Trailer segment contains 24 bits CRC for the frame.
The CRC is calculated over header segment and payload segment.
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3.2 Preliminary of Cryptographic Algorithm:
AES-CCM
3.2.1 Introduction of AES-CCM
CCM is a cryptographic algorithm known as Counter with Cipher Block
Chaining-Message Authentication Code, which is able to assure the confi-
dentiality and authenticity. AES-CCM is based on 128-bit block size sym-
metric key block cipher algorithm AES as the basic element, which is an
approved symmetric key block cipher algorithm and is specified in Federal
Information Processing Standard (FIPS) Pub [47].
AES-CCM algorithm includes two cryptographic primitives: AES and
CCM.
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). AES is the successor of
the DES and widely used in cryptographic applications and algorithms.
AES uses encryption keys of 128, 192, or 256 bits length to encrypts data
blocks of 128 bits. It is very secure against known analytical attacks. AES
is the only approved block cipher algorithm with 128 bits block size for
CCM.
Counter with Cipher Block Chaining-Message Authentication
Code (CCM). CCM is a mode of operation for a symmetric key block
cipher algorithm. CCM can be used to provide assurance of confiden-
tiality and authenticity of communication data using the techniques com-
bination of the Counter (CTR) mode and the Cipher Block Chaining-
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Message Authentication Code (CBC-MAC) algorithm. CCM includes two
processes: generation encryption and decryption verification. First, cipher
block chaining uses the payload, the associated data, and the nonce to gen-
erate a MAC value. Then, counter mode encryption encrypts the payload
and the MAC to the ciphertext. The size of final data to transfer is the size
of payload and the size of the MAC. Decryption verification uses counter
mode decryption to decrypt the received ciphertext to the MAC and the
plain payload. Then cipher block chaining uses the payload, the associated
data, and the nonce to get the MAC, and verify with the received MAC.
If the verification is passed, it can be assured that the data is transfered
from an authenticated source with the valid secure key. Compared to CRC
verification which can only detect accidental modifications of the data, the
MAC verification is able to detect both accidental and intentional modifi-
cation of the data [48]. The CRC in FlexRay data frame could be replaced
with the MAC value which assures higher level of authenticity.
3.2.2 Implementation of AES-CCM
We implemented AES-CCM based on NIST Special Publication 800-38C
[48]. AES is the chosen underlying symmetric key block cipher algorithm.
Two cryptographic primitives used for CCM are the CBC mode and the
CTR mode.
3.2.2.1 128-bit AES
AES-CCM uses 128-bit AES as the basic underlying symmetric key block
cipher algorithm. The key length of 128-bit AES is 128 bits and the num-
ber of internal rounds is 10. AES encrypts all 128 bits in one iteration.
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The encryption and decryption scheme of AES are symmetric as shown in
Figure 3-6 [49]. Key schedule is used to compute round keys for each round
based on the original AES key. AES consists of three layers in which all
128 bits are manipulated as the state of the algorithm. Each round con-
sists of the three layers. The last round does not include the MixColumn
transformation.
Key Addition Layer. A 128-bit round key which is derived from the
main key is XORed with the state.
Byte Substitution Layer (S-Box). This layer introduces confusion
to the data by nonlinearly transforming each element of the state based on
lookup tables with special mathematical properties.
Diffusion Layer. This layer provides diffusion to the state. It consists
of the ShiftRows layer and the MixColumn layer.
3.2.2.2 The CBC Mode
CBC is one type of modes of operation to provide confidentiality of data.
Figure 3-7 shows encryption and decryption blocks in CBC mode. In AES-
CCM, the CBC mode is adapted for to provide assurance of authenticity
[50]. It is applied to the data to be authenticated with an initial vector.
The final block of the CBC operations is used as the MAC of the data.
3.2.2.3 The CTR Mode
CTR is another type of modes of operation to provide confidentiality of
data. It uses AES block cipher as a stream cipher. Figure 3-8 shows
encryption and decryption blocks in CTR mode. In AES-CCM, the CTR
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Figure 3-6: AES encryption block diagram
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Figure 3-7: Encryption and decryption in CBC mode
mode is adapted to provide confidentiality. It requires the generation of
a sequence of counter blocks which must be unique within one round of
CCM.
Figure 3-8: Encryption and decryption in CTR mode
3.3 Design Motivation: Enhancement of Con-
fidentiality and Authenticity
AES-CCM assures the confidentiality and authenticity of communication
messages. It adopts both symmetric and asymmetric encryption algorithms
to optimize computation performance and meet requirement of constraint
resources. Symmetric encryption is used to secure data transmitted on
bus whereas asymmetric encryption is used to distribute symmetric keys
so that ECUs on FlexRay network use the same secure key for symmetric
encryption on messages.
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Every verified ECU in FlexRay network uses the symmetric bus group
key Ki to encrypt and decrypt internal bus data. Only the verified ECUs
are able to access local bus messages. Each ECU executes either encryp-
tion generation when sending out messages or verification decryption when
receiving messages. Table 3.1 presents the process for sending data with
encryption authentication.
Table 3.1: Sending messages with encryption and authentication
Sending
1.C = Enc(Msg,Ki) Encrypt message with group key
2.MAC = Auth(Msg,Kj) Authenticate message with authentication key
3.Send(C||MAC) Send encrypted and authenticated data
The node receiving the encrypted data needs to decrypt the encrypted
message and verify the message authentication code as in Table 3.2. Only
if verification passes, the receiver would consume this message.
Table 3.2: Receiving messages with decryption and verification
Receiving
1.Msg = Dec(C,Ki) Decrypt message with group key
2.MAC = Dec(MAC,Kj) Verify the MAC value against received message
3.Consume(Msg) Consume the message if verification passes
Within FlexRay network, node could be authenticated in advance to
communicate with each others by using AES-CCM. Messages sent from
unauthenticated ECUs will be able to detect and handle properly. To
achieve the desired authenticity, each ECU needs to have a certificate con-
sisting of identifier, public key and authorization value. The central gate-
way device, which interconnects sub-networks, maintains a list of public
keys from OEMs. The respective OEM signs signature to each ECU with
secret key. Whenever an ECU connects to FlexRay network, the gateway
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verifies the ECU using public key from the OEM. Only if the authentication
process passes, the gateway recognizes as an valid ECU. The authentication
process is as shown in Table 3.3.
Table 3.3: ECUs are authenticated by the central gateway before using in
FlexRay network.
Authentication
1.V erify(Signature,KOEM ) Verify signature of ECU using OEM public
key
2.Save(ID) Save ECU information if verification passes
3.Send(ID,Ksym) Send symmetric bus group key to ECU
3.4 Protection Using AES-CCM (32-bit MAC)
To enhance the confidentiality and authenticity of FlexRay communica-
tion on the bus, an additional security layer is applied on FlexRay node.
The security layer is embedded between application layer and FlexRay
protocol layer. It processes FlexRay messages from application layer and
outputs the authenticated ciphertext to FlexRay protocol layer. The au-
thenticated encryption is realized by applying the classic cryptographic
algorithm: AES-CCM.
Figure 3-9 shows a simple FlexRay network consisting two FlexRay
nodes. Each FlexRay node includes application layer and FlexRay protocol
layer. Application layer deploys the specific application for ECU such as
engine control module, powertrain control module, etc. FlexRay protocol
layer is the data communication layer to transfer data to FlexRay bus and
receive data from FlexRay bus. Since both application layer and FlexRay
transmission layer have no security protection, we design a security layer
on each FlexRay node.
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Figure 3-9: FlexRay network with two nodes. Each FlexRay node consists
of application layer and FlexRay transmission protocol
Thus, a single FlexRay node consists of three layers: application layer,
security layer, and FlexRay protocol layer. The application layer imple-
ments a simple logic loop that keeps transmitting messages. The security
layer consists of AES-CCM with adaption.
FlexRay node is pre-configured to transmit data frames in specific slots.
The configuration is done in a global setting for all FlexRay nodes. When-
ever data frames are available from application layer, we apply AES-CCM
on the data before sending to the FlexRay bus. Figure 3-10 shows the
structure of FlexRay node with security layer.
Figure 3-10: An additional security layer is integrated in each FlexRay
node to assure the confidentiality and authenticity
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3.4.1 Design Assumptions
Several assumptions have been made in this work to simplify the design
and implementation.
Key Establishment and Management. The secure key for AES-
CCM is required to be generated uniformly at random, or close to it. The
key should be deployed to each parties in an authorized approach. Asym-
metric encryption helps to distribute secure key to new ECUs and update
symmetric keys as needed. The secure key can only be used for AES-CCM.
We do not consider key establishment and key management in this work.
Simply, we pre-allocate a fixed symmetric key to each node in FlexRay
network.
Hardware Secure Storage. ECUs and gateway device should store
the secure keys and cryptographic algorithms in a hardware secure module
[51]. We assumed the hardware secure module has been used in this work.
Gateway. Gateway uses asymmetric encryption to authenticate com-
munication between FlexRay network with other sub-networks. Commu-
nication between FlexRay network with others is done exclusively through
the central gateway device. The central gateway device can have a hard-
ware secure module in which stores the secure keys and devices information.
Since the central gateway device holds the symmetric keys for each sub-
network, it can deliver fast and secure inter-network data communication.
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Figure 3-11: Adaption of FlexRay data frame for AES-CCM. 8 bits of
header CRC and 24 bits of trailer CRC are used to store the MAC.
3.4.2 Adaptation of FlexRay Data Frame for AES-
CCM (32-bit MAC)
To avoid changes of the protocol, the size of each field in dynamic segment
is not modified. We only adapt the content to fulfill AES-CCM algorithm
specification. Figure 3-11 presents the adapted FlexRay data frame. The
adaptations are described as below.
Header Segment. The header segment consists of the reserved bit,
the payload preamble indicator, the null frame indicator, the sync frame
indicator, the startup frame indicator, the frame ID, the payload length,
the header CRC, and the cycle count. Because the MAC provides better
assurance of integrity and authenticity than the CRC. We replaced the
header CRC field with the MAC. In detail, first 8 bits of the 11-bit header
CRC field are replaced with first 8 bits (Bit 0 to Bit 7) of the MAC. The
rest fields of header segment keep unchanged since they should not be
manipulated manually.
Payload Segment. The payload segment is adapted to store the ci-
phertext. The ciphertext is the same length of the original payload data
frame. It is stored from the starting byte position Data 0 to Data n.
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Figure 3-12: Encryption and decryption processes in AES-CCM. AES is
the basic computation elements.
Trailer Segment. The trailer segment contains a single field, a 24-
bit CRC for the frame. It is a simple checksum used for detecting header
segment and payload segment errors and does not assure data authenticity.
Since CRC does not provide any security protection, we replaced the 24-bit
trailer segment with the rest 24 bits (Bit 8 to Bit 31) of the MAC.
3.4.3 Encryption and Authentication
The sending node performs encryption and authentication processes on
FlexRay messages by using AES-CCM.
The CTR mode is used to encrypt FlexRay messages as shown in Figure
3-12 encryption part. First, a sufficiently long sequence are generated by
counter blocks for the CTR mode. In single communication cycle, the
counter block must be unique for encryption session for the data frame.
We set the counter block to an initial value and increment by one after one
encryption session.
The CBC-MAC mode authenticates FlexRay messages and generates
the MAC as shown in Figure 3-13 authentication part. The FlexRay data
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Figure 3-13: Authentication and verification in AES-CCM.
frame will be divided into multiple data blocks. The CBC applies on each
data block until the final block. The output of the final block severs as the
MAC of the FlexRay data frame.
The generated outputs include the ciphertext and the MAC against
FlexRay messages.
Ciphertext. Ciphertext length is the same as payload length and is
stored in payload segment starting from Data 0 to Data n.
32-bit MAC (Bit 0 to Bit 31). The 64-bit MAC are divided into 2
parts to store in different fields. The first 8 bits (Bit 0 to Bit 7) are stored
in the 11-bit header CRC field in header segment. The rest 24 bits (Bit 8
to Bit 31) are stored in trailer segment.
Algorithm 1 presents the steps for encryption and authentication pro-
cess [48]. Key establishment and management is ignored. Secure key is
pre-allocated to all nodes in the FlexRay network. The input data includes
the nonce, the payload data, and the associated data.
42
Algorithm 1: Encryption and Authentication
1: Prerequisites: AES-128, Secure key
2: Input : Nonce, payload
3: Output : Ciphertext, MAC
4: procedure Encryption-Authentication
5: Format Nonce and Payload into the blocks B0, B1, ...Br
6: Calculate MAC0 = AES(B0)
7: Loop from i = 1 to r, calculate MACi = AES(Bi ⊕MACi−1)
8: Let MAC = MSBT len(MACr), Tlen is the MAC length
9: Calculate the counter block values for the CTR mode
Ctr0, Ctr1, ...Ctrm, m=payload length/128
10: Loop from j = 0 to m, calculate ENCj = AES(Ctrj)
11: Let ENC = ENC1||ENC2||...||ENCm
12: Return Ciphertext = (Payload ⊕ MSBPlen(ENC))||(MAC ⊕
MSBT len(ENC0))
13: end procedure
3.4.4 Decryption and Verification
Whereas the receiving node performs decryption and verification processes
on the received ciphertext and MAC.
The CTR mode is symmetric for encryption and decryption. The same
process is used to decrypt the ciphertext as shown in Figure 3-12 decryp-
tion part. The CBC-MAC mode is applied on the decrypted plaintext to
generate the MAC value as shown in Figure 3-13. The generated MAC is
verified with the received MAC value. If the verification fails, an ERROR
flag is sent.
Algorithm 2 presents the steps for the process [48]. The input to the
process includes the ciphertext, the nonce, and the associated data. The
ciphertext is the data transferred from the sending FlexRay node. The
nonce is the header segment of the FlexRay data frame. The associated
data is empty.
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Algorithm 2: Decryption Verification Process
1: Prerequisites: AES-128, Secure key
2: Input : The nonce and ciphertext
3: Output : Payload
4: procedure Decryption-Verification
5: Calculate the counter block values for the CTR mode
Ctr0, Ctr1, ...Ctrm,m = payloadlength/128
6: Loop from j = 0 to m, calculate Sj = AES(Ctrj)
7: Let S = S1||S2||...||Sm
8: Calculate Payload = MSB(Ciphertext)⊕MSB(S)
9: Calculate MAC = LSB(Ciphertext)⊕MSB(S0)
10: Format the blocks B0, B1, ...Br using the nonce and Payload
11: Calculate ¯MAC0 = AES(B0)
12: Loop from i = 1 to r, calculate ¯MACi = AES(Bi ⊕ ¯MACi−1)





Dynamic Segment of FlexRay
Classic cryptographic algorithms provide the assurance of confidentiality
and authenticity to protect data transmitted in communication networks.
There are two approaches to achieve this goal. First approach is to encrypt
and authenticate communication data separately. A block or stream cipher
encrypts the plaintext, and an MAC algorithm authenticates the cipher-
text. For example, AES-CBC mode [50] is used to encrypt the plaintext,
and then AES-CMAC [52] or HMAC [53] is applied on the ciphertext to
generate the MAC value. Separating the two processes makes the design
and analysis easier. Second approach is to integrate confidentiality and au-
thenticity processes in which common computing blocks are shared so that
the performance is more efficient. This can be realized in three methods.
Special mode of operation. The first method is a special mode of
operation based on block cipher such as AES. CCM [48] and GCM [54] are
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two NIST recommended modes of operation for authenticated encryption.
AES-CCM is used in our work to enhance security of FlexRay network.
Stream cipher based algorithm. The second method is based on a
stream cipher which is used for both encryption and authentication. One
example is Grain128a [55].
Dedicated authenticated encryption algorithms. The last method
is to design dedicated authenticated encryption algorithms in which the
state of the cipher is updated using communication messages. For exam-
ple, Helix [56] and Phelix [57]. AEGIS [58] is also a dedicated authenticated
encryption algorithm which was recently proposed in 2013.
To optimize performance of our design, we adapted AEGIS into the
security layer to provide protection for dynamic segment of FlexRay. Before
presenting the design in details, we present the AEGIS algorithm first.
4.1 Preliminary of Cryptographic Algorithm:
AEGIS
4.1.1 Introduction of AEGIS
AEGIS is a dedicated authenticated encryption algorithm based on AES
encryption round function and was proposed by H Wu et al. in 2013 [58].
AEGIS variants include AEGIS-128 designing for 16 bytes message block
using 5 AES round functions, and AEGIS-256 for 32 bytes message block
using 6 AES round functions.
The computation speed is close to AES CTR mode and much faster than
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Figure 4-1: AEGIS-128 uses five AES encryption round functions to update
the 80-byte state with a 16-byte plaintext block. R is the AES encryption
round function without XORing.
AES-CBC mode. AEGIS provides high security properties with the con-
dition that the nonce is not reused. It ensures that recovering the AEGIS
state and key is much slower than the brutal force attacking. Moreover,
AEGIS could be used to protect the data without encrypting the header
segment, which is suitable for FlexRay network.
AEGIS uses a 128-bit key and a 128-bit nonce to encrypt and authenti-
cate a message. The associated data length and the plaintext length could
be range from 20 to 264 bits. The MAC could be less than or equal to
128 bits. AEGIS consists of two processes: encryption authentication and
decryption verification. State update function is used as the basic compu-
tation element for the two processes. Initialization is required to execute
as the first step.
State Update Function. The state update function as shown in
Figure 4-1 [58] is the basic computation element for AEGIS-128. AEGIS-
128 uses five AES encryption round functions to update the 80-byte state
with a 16-byte block of message.
Initialization. The key and nonce are loaded into the state to initialize
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Figure 4-2: The speed comparison of various cryptographic algorithms per-
forming on different message length.
the state. State update function executes 10 iterations with the key and
nonce being used as message. After the initialization, AEGIS is used to
perform encryption authentication and decryption verification on FlexRay
messages.
4.1.2 Performance of AEGIS
To process a 16-byte message block, five AES round functions are used in
AEGIS-128 and the critical path is about one AES round [58]. For each
message block, AEGIS performs two times faster than AES when lookup
tables are used for implementation. The performance of AEGIS is faster
than AES-CCM as shown in Figure 4-2 [58]. In [58], AEGIS is implemented
in C code using AES-NI and tested on Intel Core i5-2540M 2.6GHz pro-
cessor running 64-bit Ubuntu 11.04. The compiler being used is gcc 4.5.2.
The test is executed by processing a message repeatedly and printing out
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the final message. For 4096 bytes message, the speed of AEGIS-128 is
around 0.7 cpb; the speed of AES-128-CCM is around 5.05 cpb. The speed
performance of AEGIS is better that that of AES-CCM.
4.2 Design Motivation: Optimization of Au-
thentication Assurance
The decryption verification process of cryptographic algorithm checks whether
a receiving ciphertext is the valid ciphertext which is the output of the
generation encryption process. The fundamental of the authentication as-
surance is the scarcity of ciphertexts, which means the malicious attacks
cannot easily generate a valid cihertext.
The decryption verification process determines the correctness of the
MAC for the payload, the associated data, and the nonce. Depending on
the result, output of the process is either an error signal or the payload
in plaintext. The trust level of authentication assurance is determined by
the probability that an attacker can fake a valid ciphertext. In particular,
the probability is less than 1 in 2tlen (tlen is the length of MAC) that an
invalid ciphertext would pass the decryption verification process. Thus,
longer length of MAC provides higher trust level of authentication assur-
ance. However, longer length of MAC costs more storage and computation
power.
In the previous design, a 32-bit MAC is used for authenticity, which is
permitted for the formatting function in AES-CCM. But, a length of MAC
less than 64 should not be used without a careful evaluation of the risk
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[58]. To optimize the authentication assurance of the design, we proposed
an approach to adapt AEGIS for dynamic segment of FlexRay with a 64-bit
MAC for authenticity. The reasons are described as below.
Fast Speed Performance. In [58], the experiment results show that
the speed of AEGIS is around 7 times faster than the speed of AES-CCM
when executes on the same size of messages in identical experiment envi-
ronment. Thus, AEGIS could be used to generate the 64-bit MAC without
failing the requirement for FlexRay communication.
FTDMA for Dynamic Segment. Dynamic segment adopts FTDMA
to schedule data communication. It provides the flexibility to adapt the
messages scheduling to achieve our design for a 64-bit MAC. The detail
will be described in later section.
4.3 Optimized Protection Using AEGIS (64-
bit MAC)
In the previous design, we proposed the design of an additional security
layer with AES-CCM implemented on FlexRay node to enhance the confi-
dentiality and authenticity. AEC-CCM is applied on both static segment
and dynamic segment. The security layer is embedded between applica-
tion layer and FlexRay protocol layer. On the sending node, it processes
encryption authentication on FlexRay messages from application layer and
outputs the authenticated ciphertext to FlexRay protocol layer. On the re-
ceiving node, it decrypts and verifies the receiving ciphertext and outputs
either payload or error signal.
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Figure 4-3: Adaption of FlexRay data frame for AEGIS. 11 bits of header
CRC and 24 bits of trailer CRC are used to store the MAC. If payload
length is less than 250 bytes, the last 4 bytes in payload segment are used
to store 29 bits of MAC.
To optimize protection for FlexRay network, we proposed to integrate
AEGIS within the security layer for dynamic segment to improve the au-
thenticity. The optimized approach is able to provide a 64-bit MAC au-
thentication for dynamic segment of FlexRay, providing a higher security
level than the previous design.
4.3.1 Adaption of FlexRay Data Frame for AEGIS
(64-bit MAC)
To avoid changes of the protocol, the size of each field in dynamic segment
is not modified. We only adapt the content to fulfill AEGIS algorithm
specification. Figure 4-3 presents the adapted FlexRay data frame. The
adaptations are described as below.
Header Segment. The header segment consists of the reserved bit,
the payload preamble indicator, the null frame indicator, the sync frame
indicator, the startup frame indicator, the frame ID, the payload length,
the header CRC, and the cycle count. Because the MAC provides better
assurance of integrity and authenticity than the CRC. We replaced the
header CRC field with the MAC. In detail, the 11-bit header CRC field are
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replaced with first 11 bits (Bit 0 to Bit 10) of the MAC. The rest fields
of header segment keep unchanged since they should not be manipulated
manually.
Payload Segment. The payload segment is modified to store two
types of data. The bytes starting from Data 0 are used to store ciphertext
processed with encryption and authentication. The ciphertext length is the
same as payload length. If the payload length is less than 250 bytes, the
last 4 bytes (Data 251 to Data 254) is used to store extra bits (Bit 35 to
Bit 63) of the MAC.
Trailer Segment. The trailer segment contains a single field, a 24-
bit CRC for the frame. It is a simple checksum used for detecting header
segment and payload segment errors and does not assure data authenticity.
Since CRC does not provide any security protection, we replaced the 24-bit
trailer segment with 24 bits (Bit 11 to Bit 34) of the MAC.
4.3.2 Encryption and Authentication
As shown in Figure 4-4, FlexRay messages are encrypted and authenticated
by AEGIS. The outputs of AEGIS include the ciphertext and the MAC,
and are stored in the adapted FlexRay data frame.
Ciphertext. Ciphertext length is the same as payload length and is
stored in payload segment starting from Data 0 to Data n.
64-bit MAC (Bit 0 to Bit 63). The 64-bit MAC are divided into
3 parts to store in different fields. The first 11 bits (Bit 0 to Bit 10) are
stored in header CRC field in the header segment. The following 24 bits
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Figure 4-4: Encryption and authentication process for optimized protec-
tion. An extra frame may transmit whenever the payload segment has no
enough space for the MAC.
(Bit 11 to Bit 34) are stored in trailer segment. If the last 4 bytes in the
payload segment is not occupied by ciphertext, the last 29 bits of MAC are
stored in the last 4 bytes that is Data 251 to Data 254 in payload segment.
Otherwise, an extra frame is transmitted subsequently to transmit the last
29 bits of MAC. In this case, the Reserved Bit in the header segment of
both frames is set to 1. By default, a sending node shall set the reserved
bit to 0.
Before performing encryption and authentication, AEGIS initializes the
state update functions with the key and the initial vector. After initializa-
tion and associated data processing, a 16-byte block of the compounded
data frame is used to update the state and generate the ciphertext block.
The encryption process is iterated until the whole data frame is encrypted.
The latest state is used to generate the MAC value.
4.3.3 Decryption and Verification
As shown in Figure 4-5, the receiving node receives frames and checks the
value of the Reserved Bit in the header segment. If the Reserved Bit of the
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Figure 4-5: Decryption and verification process for optimized protection.
An extra frame may transmit whenever the payload segment has no enough
space for the MAC.
frame is 1 and the Reserved Bit of the subsequent frame is 1 as well, two
frames are compounded to process. Ciphertext and MAC are extracted
from the two frames and formatted a new frame as input of AEGIS.
For decryption and verification, prerequisites include same key size, ini-
tial vector size, and MAC size. The first step is initialization and processing
associated data. Then the ciphertext is decrypted based on the state. After
decrypting all ciphertext blocks, the authentication value is generated using
the state. If the verification passes, the plaintext will be used. Otherwise,





To implement and verify the design of FlexRay network with security
layer, we developed a two-node FlexRay network. As shown in Figure
5-1, Freescale MC9S12XF512 evaluation board (EVB) is used to setup the
FlexRay network.
5.1.1 Freescale MC9S12XF512 Evaluation Board
The Freescale MC9S12XF512 evaluation board (EVB) is a full featured,
easy to use system for the NXP 16-bit MC9S12XF512 MCU which consists
of an XGATE coprocessor, 512 KB flash memory and an embedded FlexRay
controller. The CodeWarrior tool suite is used to develop software for the
evaluation board through NXP USB-BDM interface in a simple and quick
way.
MC9S12XF512 MCU. MC9S12XF512 MCU is one of the MC9S12XF
family which is designed based on S12X architecture from Freescale as
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Figure 5-1: Freescale MC9S12XF512 evaluation board
shown in Figure 5-2. It provides a high performance, cost-effective dis-
tributed control solution for nodes in FlexRay network used in safety crit-
ical applications. The MC9S12XF512 MCU is a 16-bit controller instead
of 32-bit controller, which provides a reduction in overall system cost for
FlexRay network. The XGATE in the MC9S12XF512 MCU is a perfor-
mance boosting enhanced co-processor. It is programmable in C language.
The instruction set of XGATE is optimized for data move, logic and bit
manipulation. XGATE can server any peripheral module on the MCU. The
MC9S12XF512 MCU provides 128K to 512K of Flash memory which can
be used for flashing data and program. EEPROM feature is also provided
with built in Error Correcting Code.
FlexRay Module. The MC9S12XF512 MCU integrates FlexRay mod-
ule for high speed serial communication supporting bit rates up to 10 Mbps.
The FlexRay module is implemented according to FlexRay Communica-
tion System Protocol Specification V2.1 [8]. The FlexRay internal clock is
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Figure 5-2: NXP S12XF Microcontroller Block Diagram
generated from crystals ranging from 4MHz to 40MHz. The 64-pin LQFP
provides interface to a single FlexRay channel. In addition, the 112-pin and
144-pin LQFP are provided for more number of I/Os. The block diagram
of the FlexRay module is shown in Figure 5-3.
Figure 5-3: FlexRay Module Block Diagram in MC9S12XF512 MCU
5.1.2 FlexRay Network Setup
The EVB does not require special configuration and ready to use for our
project development. Two EVBs are connected to build a simple FlexRay
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Figure 5-4: A two-node FlexRay network built on two MC9S12XF512
EVBs
network. Following steps are used to setup the connected EVBs 5-4.
1. Connect the P&E USB Multilink to USB port on PC using the sup-
plied cable. And connect the other end to the J2 BDM connector on
the EVB. The P&E USB Multilink is used to flash program into the
EVB from the CodeWarrior tool.
2. Connect the FlexRay cables from J12 and J15 of one EVB to the
other’s.
3. Connect the DC power supply. If connect success, both EVB LEDs
will illuminate and display.
5.2 Software and Programming
The CodeWarrior Development Studio is used to develop the project in C
programming language for FlexRay nodes.
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5.2.1 Software Project for FlexRay Nodes
The two MC9S12XF512 EVBs are programmed as two FlexRay nodes in a
simple FlexRay network. Each EVB is programmed with the software
project which is slightly different but shares some common features as
below:
• Real time interrupted configuration with 500 ms period and schedule
the tasks on the same time.
• SPI master running at 500kHz
• SBC is initialized in debug mode.
• Both FlexRay nodes are configured for transmitting and receiving
data frames at 1.25Mbps.
• LED is always turned on to display the working process.
The two EVBs are programmed as a FlexRay sending node and a
FlexRay receiving node. Both nodes are implemented the security layer.
The Sending Node. The sending node uses a polling procedure to
send/receive frames. We define slot 1 for reception, slot 4 for transmit-
ting the static segment, and slot 62 for transmitting the dynamic segment.
Data frames transmitted in slot 4 are processed with encryption and au-
thentication using AES-CCM algorithm. And data frames transmitted in
slot 62 are also encrypted and authenticated using AEGIS algorithm. LED
displays the ciphertext and the MAC value.
The Receiving Node. The receiving node uses interrupts for frames
handling. It is defined to receive data frames using slot 4 for the static
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Figure 5-5: MC9S12XF512 EVB is connected to host through a debug
interface
segment and slot 62 for the dynamic segment. Slot 1 is used to transmit
data frames. Data frames received in slot 4 is decrypted and verified using
AES-CCM algorithm. And data frames received in slot 4 is decrypted and
verified using AEGIS algorithm as well. LED displays either valid plaintext
or an ERROR flag.
5.2.2 Programming Settings
The software project is downloaded into the EVBs through the debug inter-
face from host computer as shown in Figure 5-5. CodeWarrior Development
Studio is used to develop source code and debug project.
5.3 Correctness Verification
We have designed various test cases to verify the correctness of our design.
Only when the secure key and the nonce are identical and the ciphertext is
without any manipulation, the verification of the data frame can be passed
on the receiving node. Otherwise, all other cases should be failed. The test
cases for testing are shown in Table 5.1.
Test Case 1: Without Security Layer
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Table 5.1: Design verification test cases includes two passed cases and four
failed cases, which should cover all possible attacks on FlexRay network
Test Case Secure Key The Nonce Ciphertext Result
Test 1 - - - Pass
Test 2 Valid Valid Without manipulation Pass
Test 3 Invalid Valid Without manipulation Fail
Test 4 Valid Invalid Without manipulation Fail
Test 5 Invalid Invalid Without manipulation Fail
Test 6 Valid Valid With manipulation Fail
Test case 1 is to verify the correctness of FlexRay communication protocol.
Messages are transmitted between FlexRay nodes in plaintext. Only if the
receiving node receives the exactly same messages, the test case passes.
In test case 1, no need to care about other parameters. The test case
runs 1000 iterations. The test result is shown in Table 5.2.
Table 5.2: Test Case 1: Without Security Layer. Identical plaintext pay-
load should be received on receiving node.
Sender
Plaintext : 20212223 24252627 28292a2b 2c2d2e2f 30313233 34353637
Receiver
Plaintext : 20212223 24252627 28292a2b 2c2d2e2f 30313233 34353637
Test Case 2: With Security Layer
Test case 2 is to verify the security layer. The key, the nonce are identical on
both sending node and receiving node. If the security layer works properly,
receiving node should pass the decryption-verification process and receive
the plaintext from sending node.
In the test case, Klen = 128,Maclen = 64, Nlen = 96, Alen = 160, P len =
192. The test case runs 1000 iterations. The test result is shown in Table
5.3.
Test Case 3: Invalid Secure Key
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Table 5.3: Test Case 2: With Security Layer. The key, nonce, associate
data, and ciphertext are all valid.
Sender
Key : 40414243 44454647 48494a4b 4c4d4e4f
Nonce : 10111213 14151617 18191a1b
A : 00010203 04050607 08090a0b 0c0d0e0f 10111213
Plaintext : 20212223 24252627 28292a2b 2c2d2e2f 30313233 34353637
MAC : 7f479ffc
Ciphertext : e3b201a9 f5b71a7a 9b1ceaec cd97e70b 6176aad9 a4428aa5
484392fb c1b09951
Receiver
Plaintext : 20212223 24252627 28292a2b 2c2d2e2f 30313233 34353637
Result : Passed
Test case 3 is to verify the secure key. The nonce is identical on both sending
node and receiving node. But the secure key is different. If the security
layer works properly, receiving node should fail the decryption-verification
process and display ERROR flag.
In the test case, Klen = 128,Maclen = 64, Nlen = 96, Alen = 160, P len =
192. The test case runs 1000 iterations. The test result is shown in Table
5.4.
Table 5.4: Test Case 3: Invalid Secure Key. The nonce, associate data, and
ciphertext are valid.
Sender
Key : 40414243 44454647 48494a4b 4c4d4e4f
Nonce : 10111213 14151617 18191a1b
A : 00010203 04050607 08090a0b 0c0d0e0f 10111213
Plaintext : 20212223 24252627 28292a2b 2c2d2e2f 30313233 34353637
MAC : 7f479ffc
Ciphertext : e3b201a9 f5b71a7a 9b1ceaec cd97e70b 6176aad9 a4428aa5
484392fb c1b09951
Receiver
Key : 40414243 44454647 48494a4b 00000000
Plaintext : 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
Result : Fail
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Test Case 4: Invalid Nonce
Test case 4 is to verify the nonce. The key is identical on both sending node
and receiving node. But the nonce is different. If the security layer works
properly, receiving node should fail the decryption-verification process and
display ERROR flag.
In the test case, Klen = 128,Maclen = 64, Nlen = 96, Alen = 160, P len =
192. The test case runs 1000 iterations. The test result is shown in Table
5.5.
Table 5.5: Test Case 4: Invalid Nonce. The key, associate data, and ci-
phertext are valid.
Sender
Key : 40414243 44454647 48494a4b 4c4d4e4f
Nonce : 10111213 14151617 18191a1b
A : 00010203 04050607 08090a0b 0c0d0e0f 10111213
Plaintext : 20212223 24252627 28292a2b 2c2d2e2f 30313233 34353637
MAC : 7f479ffc
Ciphertext : e3b201a9 f5b71a7a 9b1ceaec cd97e70b 6176aad9 a4428aa5
484392fb c1b09951
Receiver
Key : 40414243 44454647 48494a4b 4c4d4e4f
Nonce : 10111213 00000000
Plaintext : 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
Result : Fail
Test Case 5: Invalid Key and Nonce
Test case 5 is to verify the key and the nonce. The key and the nonce
are both different on sending node and receiving node. If the security
layer works properly, receiving node should fail the decryption-verification
process and display ERROR flag.
In the test case, Klen = 128,Maclen = 64, Nlen = 96, Alen = 160, P len =
192. The test case runs 1000 iterations. The test result is shown in Table
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5.6.
Table 5.6: Test Case 5: Invalid Key and Nonce. The associate data and
ciphertext are valid.
Sender
Key : 40414243 44454647 48494a4b 4c4d4e4f
Nonce : 10111213 14151617 18191a1b
A : 00010203 04050607 08090a0b 0c0d0e0f 10111213
Plaintext : 20212223 24252627 28292a2b 2c2d2e2f 30313233 34353637
MAC : 7f479ffc
Ciphertext : e3b201a9 f5b71a7a 9b1ceaec cd97e70b 6176aad9 a4428aa5
484392fb c1b09951
Receiver
Key : 40414243 44454647 48494a4b 00000000
Nonce : 10111213 00000000
Plaintext : 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
Result : Fail
Test Case 6: Manipulated Ciphertext
Test case 6 is to verify the ciphertext. The key, the nonce are identical
on both sending node and receiving node. But the ciphertext is modified
during the transmission. If the security layer works properly, receiving node
should fail the decryption-verification process and display ERROR flag.
In the test case, Klen = 128,Maclen = 64, Nlen = 96, Alen = 160, P len =
192. The test case runs 1000 iterations. The test result is shown in Table
5.7.
The experiment results of both passed and failed test cases are shown
in Figure 5-6.
5.4 Performance Discussion
To compared with previous work, we simulated the design on computer and




Figure 5-6: A simple 2-node FlexRay network for testing. The results are
displayed on the LED.
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Table 5.7: Test Case 6: Manipulated Ciphertext. The key, nonce, and
associate data are valid.
Sender
Key : 40414243 44454647 48494a4b 4c4d4e4f
Nonce : 10111213 14151617 18191a1b
A : 00010203 04050607 08090a0b 0c0d0e0f 10111213
Plaintext : 20212223 24252627 28292a2b 2c2d2e2f 30313233 34353637
MAC : 7f479ffc
Ciphertext : e3b201a9 f5b71a7a 9b1ceaec cd97e70b 6176aad9 a4428aa5
484392fb c1b09951
Receiver
Ciphertext : e3b201a9 f5b71a7a 9b1ceaec cd97e70b 6176aad9 a4428aa5
484392fb c1b00000
Plaintext : 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
Result : Fail
time comparison for various length of messages executed by AES-CCM and
AEGIS. Both designs are implemented in C code and tested on Intel Core
i7-3270QM 2.6GHz processor. The compiler being used is Microsoft Visual
Studio Professional 2013. From the table, we concluded that the speed of
the design with AEGIS is faster than that of the design with AES-CCM.
Table 5.8: The speed comparison of total execution time in cycles for AES-
CCM and AEGIS.
64B 128B 256B 512B 1024B 4096B
AES-CCM 0.0076 0.0129 0.0233 0.0441 0.0854 0.3349




This thesis starts with the motivation that automotive communication net-
works are under potential security risks and lack security protection. Then
two typical in-vehicle communication networks, CAN bus and FlexRay, are
presented. Especially, the FlexRay specification version 2.1 is described in
detail. Security properties of FlexRay are evaluated and analyzed as well.
Based on the analysis result, we concluded that FlexRay network is ex-
posed to external parties and is facing potential malicious attacks. To
enhance the security properties in terms of confidentiality and authentic-
ity, we studied the properties of classic cryptographic algorithms that could
provide possible solution for FlexRay network.
Then, we proposed two designs to enhance and optimize security for
FlexRay network. The first design provides enhancement of the authentic-
ity and confidentiality by adapting AES-CCM (32-bit MAC) with FlexRay
network. To optimize authentication assurance of FlexRay message, we
proposed the second design to adapt AEGIS (64-bit MAC) with the dy-
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namic segment of FlexRay message. The two designs demonstrate that
FlexRay network could achieve the security protection with classic crypto-
graphic algorithms.
We implemented both approaches on a two-node FlexRay network con-
sisting of two NXP MC9S12XF512 evaluation boards. We designed various
test cases to verify the correctness of our designs. The results show that
FlexRay network could work with security mechanism and meet the pro-
tocol specifications as well.
Improving in-vehicle network security could ensure vehicle driver’s secu-
rity and privacy. As more vehicle interfaces are opening and more vehicle-
to-x applications are deployed on vehicle, we foresee that in-vehicle network
security will play a critical important role in automotive industry and hope
to see more research work on in-vehicle network security.
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